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Case No. 18321 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a final order granting the defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss the Information filed by the State charging 
distribution of a controlled substance for value; to wit, 
marijuana, a third-degree felony, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, . . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, • • 
-v-
ROBERT HICKEN, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Case No. 18321 
Defendant-Respondent. • • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
- - - - - .- --
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance for value; to wit, marijuana, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8(1) {1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17, 
1982 in the Fourth ,Judicial District Court for Utah County, 
;,tate of ~Jtah, the nonorahle Allen g. Sorensen :_;residing. The 
trial court issued a final order grantin~ defendant-
respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Informntion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 0:1 ~..l??F.AL 
Appellant seeks a judg~ent and order of this Court 
~;ac~tinq the dis;'.lissal by t'le lower court ann remanding the 
, . 1 :-:-. a t t e r to t ~~ e t L 1 a co 1~ r:. for trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 19, 1981, respondent Robert Hicken was at 
the home of Jerry Middleton in Provo, Utah, hoping to meet a 
new customer to whom he could sell drugs (T. 13). Mr. 
Middleton was working in cooperation with Sergeant Paul 
Markling of the Provo City Police Department (T. 13, 28, 32). 
At some point in the day, Judy Smith, a Provo City Police 
Department employee working for the detective's division, went 
to Mr. Middleton's home and was met at the door by Mr. 
Middleton (T. 13). Miss Smith was acting under the 
instructions of Sergeant Markling and was to attempt to buy 
some marijuana or cocaine from a third party (T. 13, 28). 
Miss Smith did not know Mr. Middleton, nor was she aware he 
was acting in cooperation with the police (T. 24). Mr. 
Middleton introduced Miss Smith to respondent Hicken (T. 14). 
Respondent asked Miss Smith how rnuch she wanted to purchase, 
ana after confirming the price ana quantity with his "source" 
over the telephone, respon~ent agree~ to sell her two bags of 
8arijuana for $95 (T. 13-15). 
Respondent instructed Miss Smith, ~r. Middleton and 
Mr. Middleton's little sister to get i~to Miss Sriith's car ana 
follow respondent in his car (T. 16). At approximately 1100 
so 0 th and 50 Sast in Orem, respon~ent rulled ~ver to the side 
of the road ~na askea Miss Smith to go with him to complete 
the previously negot iateii sale v1l: ile ~~r. ~v1i<1c1leton a!'"ld his 
_...,_ 
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little sister waited in Miss Smith's car (T. 16). Respondent 
drove Miss Smith in his car to the home of his "source," Mr. 
Larsen (T. 17). 
Once inside, respondent explained to Mr. Larsen that 
Miss Smith, not respondent, was to purchase the marijuana (T. 
17). Mr. Larsen, followed by respondent, went into a back 
room for a few minutes (T. 17). When they returned, 
respondent was carrying the m~rijuana. He examined it, 
commented that it was "really good stuff" and delivered it to 
Miss Smith {T. 18-19, 26). Miss Smith then paid Mr. Larsen 
,,,,- ·. - '" . 
$95, the previously agreed upon price (T. 19). 
Respondent drove Miss Smith back to her car (T. 20). 
She drove Mr. Middleton and his little sister back to their 
home, and then drove to the police station where she reported 
to Sergeant Markling and gave him the marijuana (T. 20). 
At trial, after the State rested its case, 
defendant-respondent moved to ~ismiss the Information claiming 
that in light of the evidence produced by the State, 
58-37-8(l)(a) (ii), the distribution for value subsection, and 
should have been charged under S 58-37-S(l)(a)(iv) which 
oefense counsel characterizen as the "Rrrnn<iing statute" (T. 
, t~. aoe ~1ng statute,~ 76-2-202, provides that an aic1er and 
a~~ttor may ~e charged as a ~ri~cipal, respondent was, in 
-3-
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fact, correctly charged because the evidence clearly showed 
that.he had aided in the distribution of a controlled 
substance for value {T. 33-37). Despite the State's argument, 
the court ruled that the aiding and abetting provision, 
§ 76-2-202 of the Criminal Code, did not apply to the 
Controlled Substances Act and therefore respondent could not 
be found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (T. 
37). 
Appellant takes this appeal from the final judgment 
of dismissal pursuant to Rule 26(c)(l) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT WAS CORRECTLY CHARGED UNDER 
§ 58-37-S(l){a){ii) ACCORDING TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
A. THE AIDING AND ABETTING PROVISIONS OF 
§ 76-2-202 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE APPLY 
TO THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT. 
The aiding and ahetting statute, Utah Code Ann., 
~ 76-2-202 (1953), as amended, provides: 
Every person actinq wi_t 11 t'.1e re:--ital state 
required for the cornnission o~ an of fens2 
who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionaJly aias anot~er person to 
engRge in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be cri~inally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
Under ~Jtah la\J an aider and abettor r:1ay be charged and found 
guilty as a principal. The accepte~ proce~ure is to charge 
- .1-
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the individual as a principal under the appropriate provision 
and then at trial, when the facts of the case warrant it, 
include a jury instruction incorporating the language of Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-2-202 (1953), as amended, thus enabling the 
jury to find a defendant who aided and abetted the crime 
guilty as a principal. This was the strategy employed by the 
State in this case. 
Section 76-2-202 is applicable to the Controlled 
Substances Act and specifically to Section 58-37-S(l)(a)(ii) 
, ... - •,/ . 
of that Act by way of Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-103 (1953), as 
amended, and because of the holding of this Court in State v. 
Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894 (1976). Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-1-103(1) (1953), as amended, provides: 
The provisions of this code shall govern 
the consturction of, the punishment for, 
and defenses against any offense defined 
in this coae or, except where otherwise 
specifically provided or the context 
otherwise requires, any offense defined 
outside this code; provided such offense 
was committed after the effective date of 
this code. 
I~ Jep9son, a convicti~~ for distributiori of a controllea 
substance for value, the defendant claimed that the Controlled 
Substances Act def inea completely all culpable conduct and 
there~ore a jury instruction incorporating the language of 
Section 76-2-202 of the Criminal Code was improper. This 
Cnurt ~isagreed and st~te~ in reference to the jury 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inst~uction in that case: 
The first paragraph of Instruction 6B 
incorporates, in haec verba, provisions of 
76-2-202. It is applicable here, because 
the Controlled Substance Act does not 
specifically provide otherwise, nor does 
its context otherwise require. 
State v. Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894, 896 (1976). See also: 
Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974); Howe v. 
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159, 161 (1966). 
Respondent was charged under Utah Code Ann.,§ 
58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended, which reads: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person-knowingly 
and intentionally: • • • -
(ii) To distribute for value or possess 
with intent to distribute for value a 
controllen or counterfeit substance; 
Because of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial proving 
respondent's active participation in setting up the sale of 
the marijuana, the charge, when considered in conjunction with 
the aiding and abetting jury instruction which would have been 
fo~thcoming (T. 33-34) was appropriate and correct in this 
case. 
-6-
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B. CHARGING RESPONDENT UNDER § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) AS SUGGESTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARLY 
INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-S(l)(a)(iv) (1953), as 
amended, addresses situations different from that presented in 
this case. This subsection, incorrectly characterized as the 
"arranging statute" by defense counsel and the trial court, 
must be read in its entirety for its purpose to become 
apparent. It states: 
(a) Except as authorized by thjs act, it 
,. •J 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally: ••• 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to 
have a controlled substance distributed or 
dispensed for value and distribute, 
dispense, or negotiate the distribution or 
dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
The purpose of this subsection is to provide for criminal 
liability in a situation known as a "turkey buy" where a 
co~troller1 substa~ce is offered for S -:: 10 i.-..,,.._ (, _, 1J·_._ at the tine of 
the sale a substitute or "material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so of f~red" is delivered. In this case, 
respondent offered marijuana for sale ana ~ir1 in fact deliv~r 
nari j Jana to i·1 iss Srni th wht-~n the sale took nlac~. Thus, 
coGtrary to the opinion of the judge in the lower court, 
-7-
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Utah.Code Ann., § 58-37-S(l)(a)(iv) (1953), as amended, would 
not have been an appropriate charge under the facts of this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
On the facts of this case, respondent was properly 
charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-S(l)(a) (ii). This is 
because the aiding and abetting statute, § 76-2-202, is 
applicahle to the Controlled Substances Act by way of 
§ 76-1-103 and prior decisions of this Courto The dismissal 
of the information by the trial court wai erroneous since it 
was based on the theory that§ 58-37-B(l){a)(iv) applies to 
conduct such as that of the respondent in this case. The 
plain meaning of§ 58-37-B(l)(a)(iv) shows it does not apply 
to what respondent did. 
The order dismissing the information should be 
vacated and this case should be remanded to the district court 
foe trial. 
Respectfully submitten this 
-tL 
20 Jl>-1\.. · day of May, 1982. 
-----
DAVID L. l'·!ILKI~JSON 
A~~1Tr/W 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant ~ttorney General 
-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Shelden R. 
Carter, Attorney for Respondent, Young, Backlund, Harris & ~ 
Carter, 350 East Center Street, Provo, Utah, 84601, this ZO 
day of May, 1982. 
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